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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
S 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Ann, (Supp. 1968). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Pioneer Valley Hospital is a proper party to 
this appeal. 
2. Whether a party on appeal may assign as error either 
giving or failure to give an instruction without first stating an 
exception to said instruction with enough specificity to give 
trial court notice of any alleged error. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may be deter-
minative of the issues presented in this appeal. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier 
time as the court reasonably directs, any party may 
file written requests that the court instruct the jury 
on the law as set forth in said requests. The court 
shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the 
requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instruc-
tions, unless the parties stipulate that such 
instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive 
this requirement. If the instructions are to be given 
in writing, all objections thereto must be made before 
the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, 
objections may be made to the instructions after they 
are given to the jury, but before the jury retires to 
consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the 
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an 
instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter 
to which he objects and the grounds for his objection. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the appel-
late court, in its discretion and in the interests of 
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justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an 
instruction. Opportunity shall be given to make objec-
tions, and they shall be made out of the hearing of the 
jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made 
after the court has instructed the jury. The court 
shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if 
the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct 
the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all 
questions of fact. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Complaint, filed in October, 1986, alleged claims 
against the defendant hospital and anesthesiologist, sounding in 
ordinary negligence and malpractice, res ipsa loquitur, and 
failure to obtain informed consent. On February 17, 1988, 
defendants brought a motion for summary judgment on the ground 
that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of establishing by 
competent medical expert testimony that the defendants breached 
the duty of reasonable care owed to her. On April 4, 1988, the 
trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and 
plaintiff appealed. 
On September 16, 1988, this Court granted plaintiff's motion 
for summary disposition, stating: "The trial court was mani-
festly in error in granting summary judgment since material facts 
are in dispute." Further, the office of the clerk of the Supreme 
Court for the State of Utah referred to Nixdorf v. Hicken, as 
"controlling on the issue of res ipsa loquitur. Expert evidence 
is not necessary to establish the applicable standard of care in 
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this case as it appears no medical technicalities are involved." 
The court's ruling on plaintiff's motion for summary disposition 
is attached as Appendix A. 
The case was tried to a jury from April 17 through the 19th, 
1989, the Honorable J. Homer Wilkinson residing. Throughout the 
entire course of the trial, counsel for plaintiff and counsel for 
the defendants explained to the jury the two alternative theories 
of recovery to which plaintiff may be entitled. The first was a 
theory of ordinary negligence and to meet her burden of proof, 
plaintiff was required to show that the health care provided was 
substandard. The second theory of recovery was res ipsa loquitur 
and counsel for all parties explained that no expert testimony 
was needed for recovery on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur if 
the jury was convinced that the foundational requirements of the 
doctrine had been met by the plaintiff. The jury was properly 
instructed on the two alternative theories of recovery. 
During the trial, plaintiff failed to object to expert 
evidence presented by defendant Dr. Dickson. Further, she failed 
to make a clear record of any objections to proposed jury 
instructions, making only a surreptitious record of exceptions 
out of the ear shot of the court and the defendants. For these 
reasons, plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied. 
Plaintiff now appeals on the ground that two of the given 
jury instructions, which admittedly correctly reflect the law, 
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referred to ordinary negligence and would be inapplicable should 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Based on the Supreme Court's ruling on plaintiff's motion 
for summary disposition, and based on the fact that the 
Complaint, which was never amended, addressed alternative 
theories of recovery, both theories were presented to the jury. 
Plaintiff failed to object to the introduction of expert 
testimony from Dr. Reichmann stating the requisite standard of 
care was met by the anesthesiologist, defendant Dickson. 
In addition, plaintiff failed to object to the instructions 
proposed by defendant Dickson regarding ordinary negligence. In 
fact, as late as closing argument, plaintiff commented on 
Dr. Reichmann and the opinions he presented, and explained to the 
jury that Dr. Reichmann's testimony was presented as "a defense 
to our theory of ordinary negligence." (Transcript, p. 499.) 
Thus, without voicing any objections to the proposed jury 
instructions and without objecting to the introduction of expert 
testimony regarding standard of care, plaintiff's counsel began 
his closing argument as follows: 
Good morning ladies and gentlemen. As the judge 
indicated, this is my opportunity to argue this case to 
you and let you know what I think the evidence indi-
cated. You have been sitting here now for two days 
listening, as I have, to the various witnesses testify, 
examining the exhibits. And you have heard my opening 
argument [sic] what I thought the evidence was going to 
show and what I thought it would mean. And I am now 
-4-
going to now tell you why I think I kept that bargain 
with you and have made those showings. 
To begin with, I would like to set forth once 
again the theories of law that my client is going under 
against these defendants. It's important because they 
are a little bit separate. And if you agree with one 
theory, then some of the Judge's Instructions may not 
apply to the other theory. 
The first theory is the ordinary negligence theory 
against Dr. Dickson. This is the kind of theory that 
you use if someone injures you and you file a law-
suit. . . . that's one of our theories. It is just a 
straight on malpractice cause of action against Dr. 
Dickson only. 
Now, our other theory is the theory that the Judge 
referred to as the res ipsa loquitur theory. This is 
against Pioneer Valley Hospital and Dr. Dickson. Now, 
this theory is different than the first one because it 
is a situation where we don't know what caused the 
injury. It is a situation where the events that 
occurred were under the control of someone else at a 
time when Mrs. Nielsen was out. 
(Transcript at pp. 477-479.) 
Plaintiff actually commented specifically on Jury 
Instruction 19; her counsel argued: 
So the Judge read you some Jury Instructions in which 
he stated that you are not permitted to use your own 
standard and your own experience with physicians in 
determining negligence. That is true for the common, 
for the ordinary negligence theory that we are going 
under, that the doctor was just ordinarily negligence 
as a doctor. You can't use your own experience because 
you are not a doctor, but you can use your own experi-
ence under the theory of res ipsa loquitur. And I 
suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that your 
experience and my experience is that when you go into a 
hospital for a knee operation, you should not come out 
into the recovery room with your teeth broken out. It 
is just something that shouldn't happen. 
(Transcript at p. 480.) 
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Thus, the jury was instructed on two alternative theories, 
and counsel explained the application of each theory to the jury. 
By way of special verdict, the jury found unanimously that 
plaintiff had failed to prove negligence on the part of 
Dr. Dickson and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not 
apply to Pioneer Valley Hospital or to Dr. Dickson. The jury 
never reached the issue of damages. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PIONEER VALLEY HOSPITAL IS NOT A PROPER PARTY 
TO THIS APPEAL. 
A. Plaintiff proceeded against defendant Pioneer Valley 
Hospital on a theory of res ipsa loquitur; no expert 
testimony was presented by either side regarding ordinary 
negligence. 
B. The allegedly prejudicial instructions dealt only with 
defendant Dr. Dickson and had nothing to do with defendant 
Pioneer Valley Hospital. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF MAY NOT ASSIGN AS ERROR THE GIVING 
OR THE FAILURE TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION SINCE 
SHE MADE NO TIMELY OBJECTION. 
A. Throughout the course of the trial, plaintiff proceeded on 
alterative theories of recovery. 
B. Objections must be sufficiently specific to give the trial 
court notice of claimed error. 
C. As late as closing argument, plaintiff argued two alterna-
tive theories of recovery. 
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POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY'S FINDING OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PIONEER VALLEY HOSPITAL IS NOT A PROPER PARTY TO THIS 
APPEAL. 
None of the issues or arguments raised by plaintiff on this 
appeal apply to Pioneer Valley Hospital. First, no expert 
testimony was presented by either plaintiff or defendant Pioneer 
Valley Hospital regarding the requisite standard of care. 
Second, the allegedly erroneous jury instructions were 
proposed by defendant Dr. Dickson and had nothing at all to do 
with Pioneer Valley Hospital. Specifically, Instruction No. 16 
dealt with the duty of care a physician owes a patient. 
Similarly, Instruction No. 19 described the standards applicable 
to physicians in their treatment of patients. 
Furthermore, the instructions proposed by defendant Pioneer 
Valley Hospital received no objections by either defendant Dr. 
Dickson or plaintiff and no exceptions were taken. These 
instructions accurately reflect the claims as alleged against the 
hospital. 
For example, Instruction No. 17 emphasizes that it is 
undisputed in this case that the physician defendant is an 
independent contractor and that Pioneer Valley Hospital is not 
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responsible for the negligent acts, if any, of such independent 
contractor. 
Instruction No, 18 describes the duty of a hospital towards 
a person as that of reasonable care. There was no objection to 
Instruction No. 18. Similarly, Instruction No. 20 stated: 
If you believe from the evidence that the things 
of which the plaintiff complains were caused or were 
occasioned by or from any cause or causes over which 
the defendant, Pioneer Valley Hospital, had no control, 
while for which it is not responsible, you must find 
that the hospital did not cause or contribute to the 
damage suffered by the plaintiff. If you believe that 
it cannot be determined with reasonable certainty 
whether the damage complained of by the plaintiff was 
caused by any act or failure to act on the part of the 
defendant hospital and its employees, whereby anything 
over which it had control, you must also find in favor 
of the defendant hospital. 
Again, plaintiff took no exception to Instruction No. 20. 
Instruction No. 21 instructed the jury on "unavoidable 
accidents." An unavoidable accident is defined as one which 
occurs in such a manner that it cannot justly be said to have 
been proximately caused by negligence as those terms are defined 
by other instructions. "In the event a party is damaged by an 
unavoidable accident, he has no right to recovery, since the law 
requires that a person be injured by the fault or negligence of 
another as a prerequisite to any right to recover damages." Id. 
Again, no exception was taken to Instruction No. 21. 
Finally, Instruction No. 22 instructed the jury on the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The jury was instructed that in 
certain situations it is not necessary for the plaintiff in a 
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medical malpractice action to present evidence of the defendants' 
negligence by expert testimony. Specifically, where the propri-
ety of the treatment received is within the common knowledge and 
experience of the layman, expert testimony is unnecessary to 
establish the standard of care owed to the plaintiff. The court 
instructed the jury that a plaintiff must, however, establish by 
the evidence that: (1) the accident was of a kind which, in the 
ordinary course of events, would not have happened had the 
defendant(s) used due care; (2) the instrument or thing causing 
the injury was at the time of the accident under the management 
and control of the defendant(s); and (3) the accident happened 
irrespective of any participation at the time by the plaintiff. 
The jury was instructed that if they found by a preponderance of 
the evidence that all three of the above criteria have been met 
then they could infer negligence from those circumstances. Based 
on the unanimous verdict of no cause of action, the jury appar-
ently failed to be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the three foundational requirements for the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur had been met. The evidence is sufficient to 
support to the verdict; appellant has failed to marshal any 
evidence to the contrary. (The jury instructions as referenced 
are attached as Appendix ffB.,f) 
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II- PLAINTIFF MAY NOT ASSIGN AS ERROR THE GIVING OR THE 
FAILURE TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION SINCE SHE MADE NO TIMELY 
OBJECTION. 
Appellant voiced no objections in the trial court to the 
correctness or completeness of the instructions that were 
actually given to the jury. Further, the issues raised on appeal 
were not adequately raised in appellant's general exceptions on 
the record to the trial court's decision to give defendant 
Dickson's proposed Instructions 16 and 19. Specifically, plain-
tiff failed to call to the attention of either the defendants or 
the court that said instructions were inconsistent or proble-
matic. Rather, plaintiff's counsel made a private record to the 
court reporter well after ostensibly agreeing to the proposed 
instructions. 
Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 51, a party may not 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction 
unless he objects thereto, and the objection must be sufficiently 
specific to give the trial court notice of the claimed error. 
E.A. Strout W. Reality v. W.C. Fov & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320, 1322, 
(Utah 1983). 
The specificity requirement insures that the trial court 
will understand the basis of the objections and have a fair 
opportunity to correct any errors before the case goes to the 
jury. Hansen v. Steward, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988) (citing 
King v. Feredav, 739 P.2d 612, 620-21 (Utah 1987)). A party who 
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fails to comply with this requirement is generally precluded from 
raising on appeal an issue based on a specific objection to jury 
instructions that was not presented first to the trial court. 
See, id. 
Admittedly, Rule 51 does permit the appellate court to 
address such issues even though they were not properly preserved 
below, but appellant must present persuasive reasons why the 
court should exercise such discretion. E.A. Strout W. Reality, 
665 P.2d at 1322, which requires "showing special circumstances 
warranty such a review." Candelt Intn'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 
P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1987). 
Thus, by arguing alternative theories of recovery and by 
failing to raise specific objections to proposed jury instruc-
tions, plaintiff has waived her right to assign as error the 
giving of Instructions 16 and 19. Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P.2d 179 
(Utah 1978) . 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's summary disposition of 
plaintiff's first appeal did not preclude an attempt to recover 
on the basis of ordinary negligence; it merely stated that there 
were outstanding questions of fact and that the question of the 
application of res ipsa loquitur should be resolved by a jury. 
Plaintiff made no attempt to amend her Complaint and no pretrial 
order clarified her claim against defendants. Conversely, until 
closing argument, plaintiff stated that she was proceeding 
against the doctor on both theories, and against the hospital on 
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only one theory, that of res ipsa loquitur. There were no 
instructions to the contrary. The jury, unanimously, failed to 
find liability on the part of either defendant. 
The instructions given were not inaccurate. No instruction 
misstated current Utah law. The case law relied on by appellant, 
Knapstead v. Smith Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1989) 
dealt with a misstatement of Utah law; therefore, an erroneous 
instruction was given regarding the applicable standard of care 
and the court found the jury was mislead. Such is not the case 
before this court as none of the instructions were erroneous nor 
misleading and each reflected applicable Utah law. 
III. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S 
FINDING OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Plaintiff has failed to marshall any evidence that the jury 
verdict was unsupported. Plaintiff admitted that she had 
received no dental care for the first two decades of her life 
and, as a consequence, her teeth were in horrible condition. She 
had undergone substantial bridge work and repair. There was some 
evidence that her teeth were not in optimal condition at the time 
she was seen for surgery at Pioneer Valley Hospital. (Trial 
Transcript at pp. 123-130.) A plausible explanation for the 
damage to plaintiff's teeth was never developed by any party. 
Given the state of plaintifffs dental work and the question 
regarding instrumentality, the jury verdict may well have been 
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supported by as simple a concept as unavoidable accident. It is 
critical to note that there is absolutely no evidence in the 
record that the jury was confused, prejudiced or misled. 
CONCLUSION 
Jury Instructions 16 and 19 applied only to defendant Dr. 
Dickson and not to defendant Pioneer Valley Hospital. There is 
no evidence to attack the propriety of the unanimous verdict in 
favor of defendant Pioneer Valley Hospital. In fact, by pleading 
and then proceeding on alternative theories of recovery against 
the defendants, it was necessary that the jury be instructed on 
two theories of recovery, ordinary negligence or res ipsa 
loquitur. These alternative theories were explained to the jury; 
however, the jury failed to find persuasive plaintiff's evidence 
with regard to either theory. Such a verdict should be affirmed 
as it was well founded and there is no evidence that the jury 
received erroneous instructions on the law. 
DATED this (hw\ day of (wA^Vl^f , 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Elizabeth King 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Pioneer Valley Hospital 
EKB464 
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STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
September 16, 1988 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Daniel Darger, Esq. 
100 Commercial Club Building 
-32" Exch'ange Place-
Salt Lake £ity, Utah 84111 
Lynn Nielsen, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. No. 880170 
Pioneer Valley Hospital, 
D.M. Dickson, George D. Veasy 
and Does I Through V, inclusive, 
Defendants and Appellee. 
Appellant's motion for summary disposition of this matter 
is hereby granted. The trial court was manifestly in error in 
granting summary judgment since material facts are in dispute. 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980) is controlling 
on the issue of res ipsa loquitur. Expert evidence is not 
necessary to establish the applicable standard of care in this 
case, as it appears no medical technicalities are involved. 
The summary judgment is reversed and this case is remanded 
for further proceedings. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
APPENDIX ,fAM 
INSTRUCTION NO. / / 
It is undisputed in this case that the physician 
defendant is an independent contractor, and that Pioneer 
Valley Hospital is not responsible for the negligent acts, 
if any, of such independent contractor. Similarly, the 
defendant physician is not responsible for the negligent 
acts, if any, of Pioneer Valley Hospital or its nurses or 
employees. While there are multiple defendants in this 
action, it does not follow from the fact alone that if one 
is liable, all are liable. Each defendant is entitled to 
a fair and independent consideration of his or her own 
defense, and is not to be prejudiced by the fact, if such 
become a fact, that you find that one of the other 
defendants was negligent. The instructions given you 
govern the case as to each defendant, to the same effect 
as if he were the only defendant in the action. 
APPENDIX "B 
INSTRUCTION NO. /J _ 
It is the duty of a hospital toward a person received as a 
patient to use reasonable care- A hospital is not required to 
guarantee that the treatment received by a patient while in the 
hospital will not injure or damage the patient. Rather, the 
hospital is only required to employ the care and skill required 
of hospitals under similar circumstances. Failure to use such 
care and skill constitutes negligence. 
INSTRUCTION NO . xl 
The lav recognizes unavoidable accidents. An 
unavoidable accident is one which occurs in such a manner 
that it cannot justly be said to have been proximately 
caused by negligence as those terms are herein defined. In 
the event a party is damaged by an unavoidable accident, he 
has no right to recover, since the law requires that a 
person be injured by the fault or negligence of another as 
a prerequisite to amy right to recover damages. 
INSTRUCTION NO. * ^ 
The Court instructs you that in certain situations 
it is not necessary for the plaintiff in a medical 
malpractice action to present evidence of the defendants' 
negligence by expert testimony. Specifically, where the 
propriety of the treatment received is within the common 
knowledge and experience of the layman, expert testimony 
is unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed to 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff roust, however, establish 
by the evidence that: 
1. The accident was of a kind which, in the 
ordinary course of events, would not have happened had 
the defendant (s) used due care; 
2. The instrument or thing causing the injury 
was at the tine of the accident under the management and 
control of the defendant(s); and 
3. The accident happened irrespective of any 
participation at the time by the plaintiff. 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
all three of the above criteria have been met, then you 
may find an inference of negligence from those circumstances. 
This does not mean that negligence is necessarily established, 
it merely creates an inference which may be rebutted by the 
defendant or defendants. 
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